Venezuela's deficient self-esteem also explains Chavez's quest for global status. In today's supposedly unipolar world, this means opposition to the United States and all its works. But since anti-Americanism (or anti-Bushism, or both) is a widespread, indeed almost universal phenomenon, Chavez is forced into some exaggerated feints to pull to the head of the pack. His trips to Iran and Syria are a case in point; if the United States were mainly concerned at this point with Mali or New Caledonia his itinerary clearly would have been Bamako and Noumea instead of Tehran and Damascus. To be sure, not all of these journeys have proven to be ideologically productive; in the case of Vietnam, for example, his hosts -- who now enjoy an embarrassingly good relationship with the United States -- deftly deflected Chavez's plans during a recent stay to visit a museum which harbors relics of U.S. bombing raids or a "peace village" which looks after children with health problems blamed on defoliating chemicals used in the war. His quest for a seat on the UN Security Council was conducted so gracelessly as to cost him the support of Chile, the holder of the outgoing Latin American seat.
His efforts to buy political influence in Peru have led that country's president to publicly call him "a midget dictator with a fat wallet."
Although Chavez styles himself a revolutionary,
there is very little new in his approach to the use of oil money to buy political support (or for that matter, influence abroad). Boom-and-spend populism has been the favoured recipe of every Venezuelan government in recent times; the only reason that Chavez came to power at all is that oil prices plunged in the early 1980s and did not recover until the very end of the next decade. And while the traditional political class had admittedly grown increasingly corrupt and out of touch over the last quarter-century, it was not the mediocre quality of its stewardship which led to its downfall. As Moises Naim, a Venezuelan and editor of Foreign Policy magazine, points in a little book published more than a decade ago, "for more than 30 years, Venezuela spent 10% to 14% of its total GDP on so-called social programs." It spent three times more per capita in 1985 than Chile, Jamaica or Panama. "But," he adds, "Venezuela's infant mortality was 20% higher than Jamaica's, 80% higher than Chile's and 30% higher than Panama's." As long as oil prices held firm, however, nobody seemed to think this was a problem.
In spite of Chavez's claims to be vigorously addressing his country's need for better health and education, he is simply repeating many of the errors of his predecessors, this time on an incomparably larger financial scale. The social indicators are already beginning to confirm as much. As Francisco Rodriguez recently pointed out in an article in the Guardian, after six years of a new oil boom and allegedly unprecedented deployment of medical services under Chavez,
the percentage of underweight and under height babies has actually increased. Moreover, a careful examination of the government budget reveals that --once you take out social security, which benefits mainly the middle and upper classes, who work in the formal sector --
the fraction of social spending as a whole has actually decreased. Despite the government's claims of having eradicated illiteracy, its own surveys, Rodriguez writes, revealed the country "at the close of 2005 barely down from pre-Chavez levels." Meanwhile, Transparency International ranks Venezuela the second most corrupt country in the world after Haiti. This last statistic bodes particularly ill for the future in light of the government's grandiose plans to spend untold billions to construct a gas line all the way down South America.
Perhaps the greatest paradox of all is that in spite of Hugo Chavez's incendiary rhetoric against Washington, the United States remains Venezuela's most important single customer. To be sure, the dependency runs in both directions. At present Venezuela provides its powerful northern neighbor with fully 14% of its imported oil. This undoubtedly restrains American policymakers from responding more energetically to Chavez's deliberate provocations.
That is just as well. Like all Venezuelan governments that have preceded him,
Chavez's future is mortgaged to perpetually high prices of his primary export. But unless the law of markets is miraculously repealed,
at some point in the future oil prices will drop.
When that happens Venezuela's strongman will stand revealed as having systematically squandered the nation's largest oil boom in 30 years, bequeathing a social balance as deficient (or perhaps even more deficient) than when he assumed office. What Venezuelans decide to do after that is their problem.
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